Section 1 lays out the motivation and the details of the EWL model. Section 2 presents the main technical lemmas. Section 3 contains the main classification theorem (3.3). Section 4 addresses some natural questions raised by the statement of the main theorem. Section 5 collects a few additional remarks and applications; the most striking is that in any mixed strategy quantum equilibrium of any two-by-two zero sum game, each player earns exactly the average of the four possible payoffs.
The Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein Model.
Let Gbe a two-player game with strategy sets S 1 , S 2 . The EWL construction is motivated by specifying a purely classical communication protocol: A referee issues each player a penny in in one of two states H ("heads up") or T ("tails up"). A player indicates his choice of strategy by returning his penny either flipped or unflipped. The referee observes the returned pennies and computes payoffs accordingly. Now replace the pennies with subatomic particles whose state spaces are complex vector spaces with basis {H, T}. A state is a line through the origin, which we will often denote by specifying some nonzero point on that line. The state space for the pair of particles is the tensor product of the two individual state spaces.
The referee prepares two pennies in the maximally entangled state H ⊗ H + T ⊗ T. Each player returns the penny after acting on its state by the special unitary operator of his choice. The two classical strategies (i.e. the strategies in the game G) are identified with the operators
If Players One and Two select the unitary operators U and V, we denote the resulting state by
The referee then performs an observation with the four possible outcomes CC, CD, DC and DD, and makes payoffs accordingly; if we write
(with complex scalar coefficients), then the probabilities of the four states are proportional to
Now identify Player One's strategy space with the unit quaternions by mapping the unitary matrix with top row (A, B) to the quaternion A + Bj; identify Player Two's strategy space with the unit quaternions by mapping the unitary matrix with top row (P, Q) to the quaternion P − jQ. From (1.0.2) one readily calculates the coefficients in (1.0.3) and discovers the following remarkably simple formula:
Proposition 1.1. Suppose Player One plays the quaternion p and Player Two plays the quaternion q. Then for t = 1, . . . , 4, we have
where the π t are the coordinate functions defined by
Motivated by Proposition 1.1 and the preceding discussion, we make the following definitions:
Definitions and Remarks 1.2. Let G be a two by two game with strategy spaces S i = {C, D} and payoff functions P i : S 1 × S 2 → R. Then the associated quantum game G Q is the two-player game in which each strategy space is the unit quaternions, and payoffs are calculated as
Note that for any strategy p chosen by Player 1, and for any probability distribution whatsoever over the four outcomes (C, C), etc., Player 2 can always adopt a strategy q that effects this probability distribution:
Let apoints. Those four points can be taken to form an orthonormal basis for R 4 .
Proof.
First, choose any orthonormal basis {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 } for R 4 . For any quaternion p, write
where the A α (p) are real numbers.
Define a probability measure ν supported on the four points q α by
For any two quaternions p and q, define
Then for any p we have
To conclude that µ is equivalent to ν it is sufficient (and necessary) to choose the q α so that for each α = β we have
For this, consider the function B :
B is a bilinear symmetric form and so can be diagonalized; take the q α to be an orthonormal basis with respect to which B is diagonal. Then we have (for α = β)
Theorem 2.2. Taking Player 2's (mixed) strategy µ as given, Player 1's optimal response set is equal to the intersection of S 3 with a linear subspace of R 4 .
(Recall that we identify the unit quaternions with the three-sphere S 3 .)
Proof. Player One's problem is to choose p ∈ S 3 to maximize
Expression (2.2.1) is a (real) quadratic form in the coefficients π i (p) and hence is maximized (over S 3 )
on the intersection of S 3 with the real linear subspace of R 4 corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of that form.
Definition 2.3. We define the function K : Theorem 2.4. Let µ be a mixed strategy supported on four orthogonal points q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q 4 played with probabilities α, β, γ, δ. Suppose p is an optimal response to µ in some game where it is not the case that X 1 = X 2 = X 3 = X 4 . Then p must satisfy:
Proof. Set p n = π n (p) and consider the function
In particular, if we let X = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X 4 ) then P(p, X) = P 1 (p, µ).
The function P is quadratic in p and linear in x; explicitly we can write
If p is an optimal response to the strategy µ, then (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 ) T must be an eigenvector of M (X), say with associated eigenvalue λ. From this and (2.4.2) we conclude that
where the second equality holds by an easy calculation.
Thus N (p) must be singular. But it follows from a somewhat less easy calculation that the determinant of N (p)/2 is given by the left side of (2.4.1).
3. Classification.
Definition 3.1. Let G be a two-by-two game with payoff pairs (X 1 , Y 1 ), . . . , (X 4 , Y 4 ) (listed in arbitrary order). G is a generic game if the X i are all distinct, the Y i are all distinct, the twofold sums 
Combining (3.5.2), (3.5.3), the conditions α + β + γ + δ = E 2 + F 2 = 1 and the genericity conditions, we get α = β = γ = δ as required.
Corollary 3.5A. If either player's strategy has a four-point support, then each player plays each of four orthogonal quaternions with probability 1/4.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.5 twice, one as stated and once with the players reversed.
Theorem 3.9, dealing with the case where ν is supported on exactly three points, requires some preliminary lemmas:
Lemma 3.6. It is not the case that Player Two plays 1, u, v each with probability 1/3.
Proof. If 1, u, v are played with probability 1/3 then one computes that the eigenvalues of the form (2.2.1) are X 1 + X 2 + X 3 , X 1 + X 2 + X 4 , X 1 + X 3 + X 4 , X 2 + X 3 + X 4 , which are all distinct by genericity.
Thus Player One responds with a pure strategy, and Theorem 3.4 provides a contradiction.
Lemma 3.7. Suppose the support of ν is contained in the linear span of 1, i, j. and suppose that 1 and i are both optimal responses for Player Two. Then one of the following is true:
a) The support of ν is contained in the three point set {1, i, j}
b) The support of ν is contained in a set of the form {1, Ei+F j, −F i+Ej} with Ei+F j and −F i+Ej played equiprobably.
Moreover, if b) holds and either j or k is also an optimal response for Player Two, then 1 is played with probability zero.
Proof. Suppose ν is supported on three orthogonal quaternions q 1 = A + Bi + Cj, q 2 = D + Ei + F j, Now we have
which is maximized at an endpoint, so either 1 or v is an optimal response for Player One. Similarly, at least one from each pair {1, uv}, {u, v}, and {u, uv} is an optimal response, from which b) (and therefore the lemma) follows.
Case II: Suppose at least one of the σ i is equal to zero. Up to renaming u and v, there are three ways this can happen:
Subcase IIA: α = β, γ = 0. As above, Player One's optimal response set contains a quaternion of the form (A + Bu). But P 1 (A + Bu, µ) is independent of A and B, so both 1 and u are optimal, proving the theorem. (Note that v and uv are also both optimal, so that in fact by (3.5A) this case never occurs.)
Subcase IIB: α = β, γ = 0. By Lemma (3.6), γ = α, β. Thus σ 3 and σ 4 are nonzero, so (3.8.3b), (3.8.3c) and (3.8.3d) (but not (3.8.3a)) still hold. But σ 1 = σ 2 = 0 so the same techniques now yield We can now repeat the argument from Case I.
Subcase IIC: α = β, γ = 0. Now we have σ 1 , σ 2 = 0, σ 3 = σ 4 = 0, so that (3.8.3a) through (3.8.3c) still hold, along with (3.8.3e) and (3.8.3f). We can now repeat the argument from Case I.
Theorem 3.9. If ν is supported on exactly three points, then up to equivalence, both µ and ν are supported on three-point subsets of {1, i, j, k}.
Proof. By (3.5) we can assume that µ is supported on {1, u, v}. By (3.8) we can assume without much loss of generality that 1 and u are optimal responses for Player One. (The argument below works equally well, with obvious modifications, for other pairs.) Let w be a quaternion orthogonal to 1 and u such that the support of ν is contained in the linear span of 1, u and w.
By (2.2), any quaternion of the form X + Y u + Zw is an optimal response for Player One, so by (2.4)
we have
identically in X, Y, Z. Writing out the left side as a polynomial in these three variables, the coefficients, all of which must vanish, can be expressed in terms of the components of u, v, w. Setting all these expressions equal to zero and solving, we find that {u, v, w} ∈ {±i, ±j, ±k}. (The details of this tedious but straightforward calculation can be found on pages 32-33 of [NE] .) We assume u = i, w = j.
Claim: Player Two's strategy is not supported just on 1 and i. Proof: If so, the fact that P 1 (1, µ) = P 1 (i, µ) implies that µ assigns equal weights to 1 and i, which implies P 1 (j, µ) = P 1 (k, µ), contradicting the fact that j but not k is optimal for Player One.
Thus the support of µ is a three-point subset of {1, i, j, k}. It now follows from Lemma (3.8) (together with the assumption that the support of ν contains three points) that the support of ν is {1, i, j}, completing the proof.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose ν is supported on two points. Then µ is supported on 1, u and ν is supported on two quaternions p, pv where either a) The quadruple (p, pu, pv, pvu) is fully intertwined or b) u = v and each player plays each strategy with probability 1/2.
Proof. Suppose 1 and u are played with probabilities α and β.
Any unit quaternion of the form Xp + Y pv is an optimal response for Player One; thus (2.4) with
. This, plus the identical observation with the players reversed, estabilishes full intertwining except when α = β = 1/2. In that case, P 1 (p, µ) = P 1 (pu, µ) so pu must be optimal; i.e. we can take v = u.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Remark. The statement of Theorem 3.3 makes it natural to ask for a classification of fully intertwined quadruples of the form (p, pv, pu, pvu) with u, v square roots of −1. That classification is provided in [I] .
The thrust of the result is this: All such quadruples fall into one of approximately 15 families. Each of these families is at most four-dimensional (inside the twelve-dimensional manifold of all four-tuples). For all but one of the families, it is easy to tell by inspection whether a given quadruple satisifies the membership condition. The exceptional family is one-dimensional.
In short: Condition b) of Theorem 3.3 allows only four dimensions worth of possible equilibria, all of which are easily identifiable except for a one-dimensional subset.
Minimal Payoffs and Opting Out
Theorem 3.3. classifies all mixed strategy Nash equilibria in generic games.
Here we briefly address the issue of whether these equilibria survive in a larger game where the players can opt out of the assigned communication protocol.
A key tool is the very simple Theorem 4.1; this and its corollary 4.1A apply to all two by two games (whether generic or not) and are of independent interest:
